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SUBSEQUENT USE OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
INTERCEPTIONS AND THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE:
FOURTH AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS ON THE
OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL ACT
In 1968 Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act in response to widespreld public anxiety about crime and civil dis-
order.1 Title 1112 of that complex and controversial Act provides guide-
lines for the conduct of electronic surveillance3 by federal and state law
enforcement agencies, 4 authorizing limited eavesdropping and wiretapping
pursuant to judicial approval. Title III represents Congress' effort to im-
plement the use of electronic surveillance as a police investigative tool
in conformity with the fourth amendment standards which the Supreme
Court delineated in Berger v. New York 5 and Katz v. United States.6
While prohibiting all wiretapping and eavesdropping by persons other
than law enforcement officers, the Act permits court-ordered electronic
surveillance subject to specified limitations. 7 A Title III surveillance order
must be based upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that
communications concerning a particular crime will be obtained by the
interception.8 However, when lawfully executing such an order, law en-
forcement agents occasionally intercept conversations pertaining to crim-
inal offenses other than those specified in the judicial authorization. 9
1 See generally R. HARRIS, THE FEAR OF CRIME (1969); Schwartz, The Legitimation
of Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of "Law and Order," 67 MICH. L. REV.
455 (1969).
2 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as Title II].
3 As used in this article, the term "electronic surveillance" will encompass both
wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping. Wiretapping is the interception of wire
communications without the consent of the participants. Electronic eavesdropping,
or "bugging," is the interception of communications transmitted orally, without the
consent of the participants.
4 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516(1), (2) (1970). Title III is not self-executing as applied to the
states. State and local law enforcement officers may conduct electronic surveillance
only under the authority of a state act which satisfies the requirements of Title III.
However, the federal act does not preempt individual states from enacting legisla-
tion which more narrowly circumscribes electronic surveillance. See Weinstein, The
Court Order System of Regulating Electronic Eavesdropping Under State Enabling
Legislation, 2 CONN. L. REV. 250 (1969).
5 388 U.S. 41 (1967). See notes 22-26 and accompanying text infra.
6 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See notes 31-40 and accompanying text inIra.
7 See notes 41-52 and accompanying text infra.
8 See notes 41-47 and accompanying text infra.
9 See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 934 (1972); United States v. Denisio, 360 F. Supp. 715 (D. Md. 1973); United
States v. Tortorello, 342 F. Supp. 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), af 'd, 480 F.2d 764 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973); United States v. Sklaroff, 323 F. Supp. 296
(S.D. Fla. 1971); United States v. Escandar, 319 F. Supp. 295 (S.D. Fla. 1970). See
also notes 60-63 and accompanying text infra.
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Section 2517(5)10 of Title III permits retroactive judicial approval of the
seizure of such communications. Pursuant to such subsequent ratification
of a seizure, conversations relating to crimes not specified in the warrant
become admissible as evidence in any judicial proceedings." Proponents
of Title III maintain that it effectively embodies the Supreme Court's
framework of constitutional standards with respect to electronic surveil-
lance, 1 2 thereby achieving the proper balance between fourth amendment
rights and effective law enforcement.' 3 This view has been endorsed by most
10 18 U.S.C. § 2517 (1970) provides in full:
Authorization for disclosure and use of intercepted wire or oral com-
munications.
(1) Any investigative or law enforcement officer who, by any means
authorized by this chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents
of any wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom,
may disclose such contents to another investigative or law enforcement
officer to the extent that such disclosure is appropriate to the proper
performance of the official duties of the officer making or receiving
the disclosure.
(2) Any investigative or law enforcement officer who, by any means
authorized by this chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of
any wire or oral communication or evidence derived therefrom may
use such contents to the extent such use is appropriate to the proper
performance of his official duties.
(3) Any person who has received, by any means authorized by this
chapter, any information concerning a wire or oral communication,
or evidence derived therefrom intercepted in accordance with the pro-
visions of this chapter may disclose the contents of the communication
or such derivative evidence while giving testimony under oath or affir-
mation in any proceeding held under the authority of the United States
or of any State or political subdivision thereof.
(4) No otherwise privileged wire or oral communication intercepted
in accordance with, or in violation of, the provisions of this chapter
shall lose its privileged character.
(5) When an investigative or law enforcement officer, while engaged
in intercepting wire or oral communications in the manner authorized
herein, intercepts wire or oral communications relating to offenses
other than those specified in the order of authorization or approval,
the contents thereof, and evidence derived therefrom, may be disclosed
or used as provided in subsections (1) and (2) of this section. Such con-
tents and any evidence derived therefrom may be used under subsection
(3) of this section when authorized or approved by a judge of com-
petent jurisdiction where such judge finds on subsequent application
that the contents were otherwise intercepted in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter. Such application shall be made as soon
as practicable.
11 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5) (1970). See notes 49-59 and accompanying text infra.
12 See, e.g., Burpo, Electronic Surveillance by Leave of the Magistrate: The Case
for the Prosecution, 38 TENN. L. REV. 14 (1970); Cranwell, Judicial Fine-Tuning of
Electronic Surveillance, 6 SETON HALL L. REV. 225 (1975). See note 14 infra and
cases listed therein.
1 These commentators generally emphasize the value of electronic surveillance in
combatting organized crime. See note 12 supra. See also note 90 infra. This was
Congress' primary rationale in enacting Title III:
Organized criminals make extensive use of wire and oral communi-
cations in their criminal activities. The interception of such communica-
tions to obtain evidence of the commission of crimes or to prevent
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of the lower federal courts which have considered the constitutionality of
Title 111.14 By contrast, critics of the Act, while generally conceding that
there exists a sphere within which electronic surveillance is constitutional,
question whether Title III is consistent with the balance struck by the
Court in Berger and Katz. 15
Despite the critical examination to which many sections of Title III
have been subjected, section 2517(5) has received little serious scrutiny
from either the courts or the commentators. This note will analyze the
constitutionality of the section in terms of the standards which the Su-
preme Court has articulated, both with respect to the law of search and
seizure generally and with respect to electronic surveillance. This ex-
amination will reveal that section 2517(5) cannot be sustained under the
existing contours of fourth amendment interpretation.
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT STANDARDS
A. Particularity
The fourth amendment requires that a search warrant particularly de-
scribe the place to be searched and the items which are to be seized. 16 The
particularity requirement proscribes general warrants which do not
specify the purpose of the search, the name of the person whose property
is the object of the search, or the material which is to be seized.' 7 A
general warrant, in effect, gives the executing officer discretionary author-
their commission is an indispensable aid to law enforcement and the
administration of justice.
Pub. L. No. 90-351, Title III, § 801(c), June 19, 1968, 82 Stat. 212. See also S. REP.
No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1968).
14See, e.g., United States v. Sklaroff, 506 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Ramsey, 503 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. James, 494 F.2d
1007 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974);
United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866
(1973); United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
918 (1974); United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 934 (1972). Contra, United States v. Whitaker, 343 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Pa.
1972), rev'd, 474 F.2d 1246 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973).
15 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 1; Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance by Leave of
the Magistrate: The Case in Opposition, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 169 (1969); Note,
Federal Decisions on the Constitutionality of Electronic Surveillance Legislation,
11 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 639 (1973); Note, Federal Procedure for Court Ordered
Electronic Surveillance: Does It Meet the Standards of Berger and Katz?, 60 J.
CruM. L.C. & P.S. 203 (1969); Note, Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance-
Title III of the Crime Control Act of 1968, 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 319 (1969).
16 The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
17 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58 (1967).
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ity to search wherever suspicion leads him and to seize whatever he finds.1 s
In this manner, a general search undermines the central objective of the
fourth amendment, which is the protection of an individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy against arbitrary intrusion by government officials. 19
In enunciating stringent constitutional standards with respect to elec-
tronic surveillance, the Court has recognized that electronic surveillance
is an extraordinary form of search, since it involves an especially serious
intrusion on privacy.20 Accordingly, law enforcement officers using such
investigative methods must strictly adhere to particular and specific lim-
itations on the conversations to be searched for and seized. 21 Moreover,
electronic surveillance poses a grave threat to the particularity require-
ment, because the use of electronic devices is likely to lead to searches
of indiscriminate breadth. This was a key factor in Berger v. New York,'
-2
where the Court held that a New York electronic surveillance statute
23
was unconstitutional on its face. Berger had been convicted of conspiracy
to commit bribery on the basis of evidence derived from court-ordered
eavesdropping extending over a four-month period. The surveillance
had been authorized and executed in accordance with the terms of the state
statute, but the statute did not require the court order to describe with
particularity the place to be searched. Nor did it demand identification
of the specific crime which allegedly had been or was being committed,
or of the conversations which were to be seized. 24 The statute also per-
mitted the issuance of court orders authorizing surveillance for sixty days
on the basis of a single showing of probable cause, and the statute's pro-
vision which allowed an unlimited number of sixty-day extensions without
a further showing of probable cause compounded this flaw. Noting that
particularity was especially important in the context of electronic sur-
18 The dangers inherent in a general search were discussed in the celebrated case
of Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765), where
Lord Camden asserted that such sweeping intrusions were "subversive of all the
comforts of society." 19 How. St. Tr. at 1066. The antipathy of the framers to
general warrants was the impetus behind the fourth amendment. In the eighteenth
century, not only in England but also in the colonies, warrants were often issued
authorizing a general search of a person's home or business for papers containing
seditious statements. Moreover, sweeping writs of assistance were used by the
Crown to enforce the customs laws. See generally N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
22-78 (1937).
19 The Court has often emphasized that the thrust of the fourth amendment is to
protect the security of individual privacy against arbitrary police intrusion. See, e.g.,
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949);
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
20 See note 25 and accompanying text infra.
21 See, e.g., Dash, Katz-Variations on a Theme by Berger, 17 CATH. U.L. REV. 296
(1968); Schwartz, Six Years of Tapping and Bugging, I Civ. LiB. REV. 26 (Summer
1974). See also notes 22-26 and accompanying text infra.
22388 U.S. 41 (1967).
23 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRO. § 813-a (McKinney 1958).
24 The majority opinion, however, noted that the New York statute did conform
to the fourth amendment requirement that electronic surveillance be conducted only
pursuant to judicial authorization. See text accompanying notes 31-40 infra.
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veillance,2 5 the Court held that the New York statute prescribed in-
adequate standards to limit the scope of electronic searches by law en-
forcement officials. Rather than carefully circumscribing electronic sur-
veillance so as to ensure the security and privacy of individuals against
unreasonable intrusions, the statute permitted the issuance of orders which
were tantamount to general warrants giving the executing officer discretion
to seize any and all conversations.2 6
The Court contrasted the indiscriminate use of electronic surveillance
under the New York statute with the precise surveillance procedures
which had been sustained in Osborn v. United States2 one year earlier. In
Osborn, two federal judges jointly authorized a surveillance procedure
employing a tape recorder concealed on an informant's person to secure
evidence of an attorney's attempt to bribe a juror. The judicial authoriza-
tion was based upon a detailed affidavit which alleged the commission
of this specific criminal offense. Only the anticipated incriminating con-
versations between the informant and the suspect were intercepted in
the conduct of the search. The Osborn Court upheld the admission into
evidence of the recording, emphasizing that the surveillance was con-
ducted by federal agents investigating a specific offense and that the scope
of the search was restricted to the limited purpose outlined in the judicial
order.2 8 Moreover, the Osborn order particularly described the type of
conversation sought, so that the investigating officer could not search
unauthorized conversations or use the order as "a passkey to further
search"2 9 once the specified conversation was intercepted. Finally, Osborn
involved one limited intrusion rather than a series of intrusions or a con-
tinuous surveillance. When the executing officer sought to resume the
search, he was granted a new order only after a separate showing of prob-
able cause. 30
In Katz v. United States,31 the Court reaffirmed the principle that par-
ticularity is an indispensable aspect of constitutionally permissible elec-
tronic surveillance. Katz involved surveillance limited not only in time
and place, but also to a specific person and specific conversations. Fed-
eral agents had probable cause to believe that the petitioner was using a
certain public telephone at the same time each day for the purpose of
25 The Court explained:
The need for particularity and evidence of reliability in the showing
required when judicial authorization of a search is sought is especially
great in the case of eavesdropping. By its very nature eavesdropping
involves an intrusion on privacy that is broad in scope.
388 U.S. at 56. In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart contended that the fourth
amendment required an exceptionally rigorous standard of probable cause with re-
spect to electronic surveillance. Id. at 69.
26 Id. at 58-59.
27 385 U.S. 323 (1966). See Dash, supra note 21, at 311.
28 385 U.S. at 330.
29 388 U.S. at 57.
30 385 U.S. at 330.
31 389 U.S. 347 (1968). For a discussion of Katz, see Dash, supra note 21;
SCHWARTZ, Electronic Eavesdropping-What the Supreme Court Did Not Do, 4 CRIM.
L. BULL. 83 (1967).
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transmitting gambling information. Without a court order, they attached
a listening device to the outside of a telephone booth for the specific
purpose of determining the content of the petitioner's telephone conver-
sations. Surveillance was confined to those periods during which the
suspect used the phone, and the agents intercepted only the conversations
of the petitioner. Underscoring the principles enunciated in Berger, the
Court concluded that the surveillance procedure in Katz was consistent
with the particularity requirement of the fourth amendment. 32
In summary, Osborn, Berger, and Katz clearly established the proposi-
tion that electronic surveillance is constitutionally permissible only if it
is narrowly circumscribed. Otherwise, wiretapping and eavesdropping
constitute general exploratory searches for incriminating evidence, thereby
contravening the particularity requirement of the fourth amendment.
B. Judicial Control
The fourth amendment not only mandates particularity in the conduct
of electronic surveillance, but also requires judicial control of wire-
tapping and eavesdropping by law enforcement agencies. Notwithstanding
the extremely narrow scope of the search in Katz, the Supreme Court re-
versed the petitioner's conviction because the surveillance had not been
conducted within a framework of judicial authorization and control. 33
Despite the restraint which the federal officers had exercised in circum-
scribing their surveillance, the Court held that the absence of prior judicial
authorization rendered the search unreasonable within the meaning of
the fourth amendment. 34 Actual compliance with the particularity standard
32 The Court observed:
[Tlhis surveillance was so narrowly circumscribed that a duly authorized
magistrate, properly notified of the need for such investigation, specif-
ically informed of the basis on which it was to proceed, and clearly
apprised of the precise intrusion it would entail, could constitutionally
have authorized, with appropriate safeguards, the very limited search
and seizure that the Government asserts in fact took place.
389 U.S. at 354.
3 d. at 356-59.
34 A critical issue in Katz was whether fourth amendment protection extended to
surveillance conducted by attaching an electronic device to the outside of a tele-
phone booth, thus permitting interception of conversations without physical entry
into the area in which the conversations were taking place. 389 U.S. at 349-53.
In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), the first case in which the
Supreme Court considered the legal status of wiretapping, the majority had ruled
that the fourth amendment applied only to official intrusions involving a physical
trespass. The Olmstead trespass doctrine was extended to electronic eavesdropping
in Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), where the Court held that
use of a detectaphone placed against the partition wall of the defendant's office for
the purpose of eavesdropping did not constitute a trespass and was, accordingly,
permissible under the fourth amendment. The Olmstead-Goldman rationale was
both refined and undermined in Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961),
which held that the fourth amendment was violated where a "spike mike" was
inserted into a party wall, thereby making contact with the petitioner's heating
duct and converting the entire heating system into a sound conductor. Advancing
a "constitutionally protected area" test, the Court stated that it was irrelevant
[VOL. 9: 529
Use of Wiretapping Interceptions
could not serve as a basis for retroactive ratification of electronic sur-
veillance conducted without a court order.
Writing for the Court, Justice Stewart stated that the self-imposed
restraint of the executing officers was not the constitutional equivalent
of a determination of probable cause by a neutral judicial officer prior to
the commencement of the search, followed by a specific court order set-
ting forth the precise limits of the surveillance. 35 The fourth amendment re-
quires the interposition of the judiciary between the police and the citizenry
in determining the scope of a search. Otherwise, the right to be secure
against unreasonable searches and seizures would depend entirely upon
the discretion of the police. 36 Justice Stewart further noted that an after-
the-fact determination of the reasonableness of a search is inherently
less reliable than an impartial predetermination of probable cause.37 A
rigorous determination of probable cause is especially important in the
context of electronic surveillance, 38 where the search is particularly in-
trusive and where the nature of the evidence seized may raise many ques-
tions concerning its reliability.39 The fourth amendment requires that
searches and seizures be preceded by a judicial determination of probable
cause. While noting that there are a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions to the general principle of prior judicial approval,
the Court stated that these exceptions are not applicable in the context
"whether or not there was a technical trespass under the local property law
relating to party walls." Id. at 511. See Dash, supra note 21; Kamisar, The Wiretap-
ping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Professor's View, 44 MINN. L. REV. 891 (1960).
In Katz, the Court expressly rejected the trespass doctrine. Although not involving
actual physical penetration of a "constitutionally protected area," the surveillance
was held to constitute a fourth amendment search because it violated the privacy
upon which the petitioner had justifiably relied while using the telephone booth. In
the Court's words:
[T]his effort to decide whether or not a given "area," viewed in the
abstract, is "constitutionally protected" deflects attention from the prob-
lem presented by this case. For the Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection
.... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area access-
ible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.
389 U.S. at 351-52 (footnotes omitted).
35 389 U.S. at 356-57.
36 Id. at 358-59. Quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964), Justice Stewart
stated that subsequent justification for the search was "too likely to be subtly
influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment."
37 389 U.S. at 358-59.
38 Justice Stewart contended in his concurring opinion in Berger that the standard
of reasonableness embodied in the fourth amendment requires that "the showing of
justification match the degree of intrusion." Accordingly, the "most precise and
rigorous standard of probable cause" should be required in order to justify electronic
surveillance. 388 U.S. at 69.
39 In using evidence gathered through electronic surveillance, there may be diffi-
culties in determining whether the recordings are authentic and whether changes,
additions or deletions have been made. The identity of the speakers may be open
to challenge, and the recordings may be inaudible or indistinct. E. LAPIDUS, EAVES-
DROPPING ON TRIAL 155 (1974). See also Schwartz, supra note 1, at 485 n.157.
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of electronic surveillance. 40 The Court concluded that prior judicial author-
ization constitutes a second indispensable constitutional precondition of
lawful electronic surveillance, even where the search satisfies the par-
ticularity standard of the fourth amendment.
II. THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO THE
Berger-Katz STANDARDS
A. The Basic Statutory Scheme
The Berger and Katz decisions provide the framework of constitutional
standards which control the use of electronic surveillance by law enforce-
ment agencies. In enacting Title III, Congress endeavored to establish a
detailed statutory procedure for electronic surveillance consistent with
the standards set forth in these decisions. 41 Under Title III a judge of
competent jurisdiction may authorize wiretapping and eavesdropping in
order to investigate a wide variety of offenses.42 To obtain this court
authorization the official 43 seeking a surveillance order must state the
facts and circumstances upon which he bases his belief that the judge
should issue the order. 44 This information is intended to facilitate the
4 0 The Court stated:
It is difficult to imagine how any of those exceptions could ever
apply to the sort of search and seizure involved in this case. Even
electronic surveillance substantially contemporaneous with an indi-
vidual's arrest could hardly be deemed an "incident" of that arrest. Nor
could the use of electronic surveillance without prior authorization be
justified on grounds of "hot pursuit." And, of course, the very nature
of electronic surveillance precludes its use pursuant to the suspect's
consent.
389 U.S. at 357-58 (footnotes omitted).
41S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 97-108 (1968).
42 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516(1), (2) (1970). Among the federal offenses for which elec-
tronic surveillance may be authorized are murder, kidnapping, robbery, extortion,
bribery, transmission of wagering information, obstruction of justice, various rack-
eteering offenses, violations of narcotics laws and conspiracy to commit any of the
enumerated offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1970). In addition, state enabling laws
may extend electronic surveillance to the investigation of any state crime "dangerous
to life, limb or property, and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year
.... .18 U S.C. § 2516(2) (1970).
43 In the case of a federal surveillance, the application must be authorized by the
Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1970). See
United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974). In the case of a state or local gov-
ernment, the application must be authorized by the principal prosecuting attorney
of the state or political subdivision. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (1970).
44 The applicant must present evidence constituting probable cause to believe that
an offense to which Title III is applicable "has been, is being, or is about to be com-
mitted." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(b) (1970). The applicant must also submit a detailed de-
scription of the particular offense under investigation, the nature and location of the
facilities to be placed under surveillance, the type of communications sought, and the
identity, if known, of the persons whose conversations are to be intercepted. Id. A
law enforcement official applying for a surveillance order must also specify the
period of time during which the interception is to be made. If the surveillance is
[VOL. 9:529
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magistrate's determination whether or not to authorize the surveillance.
If the judge concludes that the showing is sufficient, 45 he may grant an
order in accordance with statutory limitations46 which are intended to
ensure that the order links up a specific person, a specific offense, and a
specific place, thereby satisfying the constitutional requirement that
electronic surveillance be used only under circumstances which fully com-
ply with the requirement of particularity. 47 Title III further provides that
no court may authorize the interception of communications for any period
longer than is necessary to accomplish the objective of the authorization,
nor in any event longer than thirty days. Extensions may be authorized
upon a separate determination of probable cause.48 Finally, every order
and extension must provide that the interception be conducted in such
a manner as to minimize the interception of communications not other-
wise subject to interception. 49
During the past eight years federal courts have, almost without ex-
ception, approved Congress' interpretation of the constitutional standards
articulated in Berger and Katz. Relying on the presumption of the constitu-
tionality of federal legislation, the courts have generally held that Title III
adequately circumscribes the scope of electronic surveillance. 50 Some com-
mentators, however, have contended that many of the safeguards of Title
III are illusory. 51
not to terminate when the communications sought are first intercepted, the officer
must set forth the particular facts establishing probable cause to believe that the same
type of communications will occur subsequently. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(d) (1970).
The applicant must also show whether other investigative procedures have been tried,
and why alternatives would be unlikely to succeed or would be too dangerous to
employ. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (1970).
45 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (1970) requires that the authorizing magistrate de-
termine that probable cause exists with respect to a particular offense enumerated
in 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1970). See note 42 supra.
46 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(4)(a)-(c) (1970).
47 See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 102 (1968).
48 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1970).
49 Id. For a detailed discussion of this particular provision of Title III, see Note,
Minimization of Wire Interception: Presearch Guidelines and Postsearch Remedies,
26 STAN. L. REV. 1411 (1974). See also notes 60-62 and accompanying text infira.
50 See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
51 For critical discussions of the various provisions of Title III, see the articles in
note 12 supra. Although Congress sought to implement the principles of particularity
and judicial control, Title III permits departure from these safeguards in several
situations. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (1970) allows a law enforcement official
"specially designated by the Attorney General or by the principal prosecuting at-
torney of any State or subdivision thereof" to initiate electronic surveillance without
prior judicial authorization when confronted by an "emergency situation," involving
conspiratorial activities which threaten national security or which are characteristic
of organized crime. This provision is complemented by 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1970)
which attempts to preserve "the constitutional power of the President" to authorize
wiretapping and bugging without judicial supervision in cases which involve either
foreign or domestic threats to national security. Although a discussion of these
provisions is beyond the scope of this article, it is clear that they raise serious con-
stitutional questions in light of the Berger and Katz standards.
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B. Subsequent Use of Interceptions
Section 2517(5) of Title 111,52 which permits the use and disclosure
of conversations concerning crimes not specified in the court order by
law enforcement officials other than those obtaining the order, does not
comport with the controlling constitutional criteria. The disclosure and
use of intercepted communications is an aspect of electronic surveillance
which the Supreme Court has never squarely considered. Section 2517(1)
provides that a law enforcement officer who has obtained knowledge of
the contents of any electronic surveillance, or evidence derived therefrom,
may disclose that information to other investigative or law enforcement
officers.53 In addition, section 2517(2) authorizes the use of the con-
tents of any intercepted communications by any officer who has obtained
knowledge of such information, 54 in order to establish probable cause
for arrest, to establish probable cause for engaging in further search
and seizure, or to develop witnesses for trial. 55 Congress intended
that the sharing and use of this information between law enforcement
agencies would be circumscribed by safeguards for privacy, 56 but the only
safeguard set forth in sections 2517(1) and 2517(2) is that any disclosure
and use must be appropriate to the proper performance of the official
duties of the officers. 57 Finally, under section 2517(3), any person who has
any information concerning an intercepted communication, or evidence
derived therefrom, may disclose the contents of the interception in testi-
mony before any state or federal court or grand jury.58
These provisions do not raise serious constitutional questions until they
are viewed in conjunction with section 2517(5), which permits information
relating to offenses other than those specified in the judicial order author-
izing the surveillance to be used or disclosed in any manner set forth in
the first three provisions of section 2517, provided that a judge of com-
petent jurisdiction finds on subsequent application that the contents were
intercepted in accordance with the provisions of Title III.59 Because
electronic surveillance is an inherently uncontrollable investigative tool,
section 2517(5) raises serious constitutional questions. A tap on a tele-
phone, for example, intercepts the conversations of everyone who uses
the phone to make a call, and those of everyone who calls to or is called
from the tapped phone, regardless of how unrelated the intercepted com-
52 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5) (1970). See note 10 supra.
53 18 U.S.C. § 2517(1) (1970). See note 10 supra.
54 18 U.S.C. § 2517(2) (1970). See note 10 supra.
55 See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 99 (1968).
561d.
57 18 U.S.C. §§ 2517(I),(2) (1970). Intercepted conversations may have political
significance or commercial value. They may be of interest to the press or be used
for blackmail. Clearly these provisions proscribe such uses of interceptions. How-
ever, Title III offers no standard for determining which uses of such evidence are
appropriate to the proper performance of the official duties of police officers. For a
discussion of the difficulty of policing the police, see Spritzer, supra note 15, at 189-
91.
58 18 U.S.C. § 2517(3) (1970).
59 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5) (1970).
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munications are to the authorized purpose of the tap. 60 Electronic eaves-
dropping is potentialy even broader than wiretapping in establishing a
dragnet for the seizure of conversations, since a bugging device can inter-
cept every utterance of each individual in the area under surveillance. 61
Although probable cause may exist with respect to one party to an inter-
cepted conversation, it does not necessarily exist with respect to other
persons overheard. Title III, however, permits the monitoring and inter-
ception of a third party's conversations, thereby permitting the seizure of
one person's statements merely upon the showing of probable cause as to
someone else. 62 Section 2517(5) then sanctions the evidentiary use of such
conversations involving crimes which are not the subject of the original
court authorization, including the communications of persons as to whom
there has been no showing of probable cause prior to the infringement
on their reasonable expectation of privacy. 63
III. THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE
A. Searches Under a Warrant
Section 2517(5) is based upon the extension of the plain view doctrine
to the context of electronic surveillance. The plain view concept con-
stitutes an exception to the basic fourth amendment rule that searches and
seizures conducted without prior approval by a judge or magistrate are
per se unreasonable. 64 The crux of the plain view exception is that the
seizure of incriminating evidence which falls within plain view is permis-
sible, if a police officer has prior justification for an intrusion in the
course of which he inadvertently discovers such evidence. 65 Although
6 0o See Hearings on S. 675 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedure
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1180 (1967) (testimony
of Speiser).
61 See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), where conversations
throughout the entire house were overheard. See also Williams, The Wiretapping-
Eavesdropping Problem: A Defense Counsel's View, 44 MINN. L. REV. 835 (1960).
62 As the court noted in United States v. Whitaker, 343 F. Supp. 358, 367 (E.D.
Pa. 1972), rev'd, 474 F.2d 1246 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973):
In both Osborn and Katz, only one end of a conversation was listened
to involving a nonconsenting party for whom probable cause to intercept
had been established. Under this statute [Title III] not only are both
ends of the conversation being monitored without any consent, but
often the very purpose of listening will be to obtain evidence against
many individuals.
63 For a discussion of the reasonable expectation of privacy test, see note 34
supra.
64 For an analysis of the development of the warrant requirement as "the central
tenet of fourth amendment jurisprudence," see Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 409-14 (1974). See also Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-59 (1967).
65 In Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968), the Court formulated the rule
as follows:
[O]bjects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in
the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be intro-
duced in evidence.
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this exception to the warrant requirement developed with respect
to searches and seizures of tangible objects, Congress and several lower
federal courts have uncritically extended the doctrine to cases involving
electronic surveillance, 66 characterizing section 2517(5) as merely a re-
statement of existing decisional law adapted to fit the electronic sur-
veillance context. 67
The proposition that section 2517(5) restates existing law is open to
challenge since, even in the physical search context, the scope of the
plain view exception is not clearly defined. The exception initially de-
veloped in cases involving warrantless searches incident to an arrest. It
is a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement that police
officers effecting an arrest may search the person of the suspect and the
place where the arrest is made. 68 Under the plain view doctrine, the officers
may seize incriminating evidence which comes into plain view in the
course of an appropriately limited search incident to an arrest. 69 In recent
years the Court has extended the plain view exception beyond the con-
fines of the arrest context, holding that police may seize incriminating
evidence which they inadvertently discover while in "hot pursuit" of a
fleeing suspect.70 In one case the Court even relied upon the exception to
sustain the seizure of incriminating evidence by an officer who was not
engaged in an investigative search. 71 However, electronic surveillance
under the court order procedure established by Title III is an instance
of a search pursuant to a warrant. Accordingly, if section 2517(5) is to be
justified as a mere restatement of existing law, the relevant inquiry is
to whether the plain view concept is a recognized exception insofar as
searches under a warrant are concerned.
Nearly fifty years ago, the Supreme Court addressed this question in
Marron v. United States.72 Although subsequent decisions cast doubt
Id. at 236. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-72 (1971). See also
notes 78-85 and accompanying text infra. See generally LaFave, Search and Seizure:
"The Course of True Law... Has Not ... Run Smooth," 1966 ILL. L. FORUM 255,
333-43; The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 40, 237-50 (1971); Note,
"Plain View"-Anything but Plain: Coolidge Divides the Lower Courts, 7 LOYOLA L.
REV. 489 (1974).
66 S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 100 (1968); United States v. Tortorello,
342 F. Supp. 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), afl'd, 480 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 866 (1973); United States v. Sklaroff, 323 F. Supp. 296 (S.D. Fla. 1971); United
States v. Escandar, 319 F. Supp. 295 (S.D. Fla. 1970); cf. United States v. Denisio,
360 F. Supp. 715 (D. Md. 1973).
67 United States v. Sklaroff, 323 F. Supp. 296, 307 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
68 See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), where the Court discussed
the rationale and limitations of the exception for searches incident to arrest.
69 Id.; Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968); Ker v. California, 374 U.S.
23 (1963); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Go-Bart Importing Co.
v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
70 Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
71 Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968). The Court upheld the seizure of an
incriminating notecard which came within the plain view of an officer who was
routinely searching and securing an automobile which had been impounded as evi-
dence.
72 275 U.S. 192 (1927). But see notes 78-85 and accompanying text infra.
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on the validity of Marron, the Court indicated that law enforcement officers
engaged in lawfully executing a search warrant may not seize items not
described therein. Federal agents had obtained a warrant for the seizure
of intoxicating liquors and articles for their manufacture. While search-
ing the designated premises for these objects, the officers found certain
ledgers and bills connected with the illegal enterprise, which they seized
along with those objects named in the warrant. The Court held that a
lawful search under a warrant could not justify the seizure of inadver-
tently discovered evidence which had not been described in the warrant.
The seizure of items not specified in the warrant was deemed to be in-
consistent with the particularity requirement of the fourth amendment.7 3
Some commentators have maintained that the Marron principle is an
indispensable element of the fourth amendment proscription of general
searches.7 4 By confining the permissible seizure to the described object,
the rule reduces the incentive for officers to engage in a sweeping foray
beyond the scope of the judicial order.75 Moreover, the Marron principle,
which requires officers to obtain a separate warrant in order to seize un-
anticipated incriminating evidence, strips the executing officer of dis-
cretion in determining the scope of the warrant, thereby ensuring judicial
control over the procedure. Indeed, a few courts have construed Marron
as so narrowly circumscribing police discretion that even contraband
not described in the warrant may not be seized if found in the course of a
search under a warrant.76
In essence, Marron limits the plain view exception to warrantless
searches. This implies that the plain view doctrine cannot adequately
sustain the constitutionality of section 2517(5), unless the requirements
of particularity and judicial control are less strictly applied in the elec-
tronic surveillance context than in the setting of the conventional search.
73 The Court stated that:
The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the thing to
b seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents
the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to
what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer exe-
cuting the warrant.
275 U.S. at 196. However, since the agents lawfully arrested the person in charge of
the premises, the incriminating evidence which fell within their plain view was held to
be seizable as incident to an arrest. See notes 68-69 and accompanying text supra.
74 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 1, at 465-66; Spritzer, supra note 15, at 188.
75 Professor Schwartz contended prior to the decision in Coolidge:
Were the Marron limitation abolished, all searches and seizures would
verge on the general, so long as the initial entry was legitimate; there
would be no reason to stop .the search, even after the described item
was seized, since everything else that was found could be used in a sub-
sequent prosecution.
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 466.76 See, e.g., United States v. Harrison, 319 F. Supp. 888 (D.N.J. 1970); United
States v. Coots, 196 F. Supp. 775 (E.D. Tenn. 1961). Relying on Marron v. United
States, these courts held that officers violated the fourth amendment when they
seized illegal weapons in the course of a search under a warrant. See also Warden,
Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), which explicitly rejected any
distinction between "mere evidence" and contraband, stolen goods or other instru-
mentalities of crime.
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Such an approach would be incompatible with the Berger and Katz de-
cisions. 77
The Court's decision in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,78 however, casts
doubt upon the continuing validity of Marron. Language in the plurality
opinion indicates a willingness to expand the plain view exception to
searches pursuant to a warrant. Writing for four members of the Court,7'.
Justice Stewart prefaced an extensive discussion of the plain view excep-
tion by asserting that one example of the exception is the situation in
which the police have a warrant to search a place for specified objects
and in the course of the search come across an incriminating article not
designated in the warrant.80 Justice Stewart presented no direct authority
supportive of his statement concerning the scope of the plain view ex-
ception,8 ' and he did not advance a specific justification for extending
the plain view exception beyond the context of warrantless searches.
Nevertheless, Justice Stewart's reasons for applying the exception in
the warrant context are implicit in his view that, if officers conducting
a lawful search inadvertently discover evidence in plain view, it is a
needless inconvenience to require them to obtain a separate warrant.8 2
77 See part I supra.
78 403 U.S. 443 (1971). In Coolidge, the petitioner became the suspect in a mur-
der because of his unexplained absence from his home on the night of the crime and
his ownership of an automobile which matched the description of one seen at the
approximate time and place of the murder. When further investigation, including
ballistics tests, produced additional evidence incriminating Coolidge, police obtained
warrants for his arrest and for the search of his house and car. Coolidge was arrested
at his home and taken into custody. The incriminating automobile, found parked in
Coolidge's driveway, was towed to the police station and impounded. Vacuum
sweepings of the car linked the suspect to the murder victim. The Court held that
the warrants, which had been signed by the State Attorney General, who had con-
ducted the investigation, were defective because they had not been issued by a "neu-
tral and detached magistrate." Id. at 449. The Court, proceeding to treat the search
and seizure as a warrantless one, considered and rejected the state's efforts to justify
the search and seizure of the car under three recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirement, one of which was the plain view exception. Id. at 465-73.
79 Justice Stewart was joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, while
Justices White and Black wrote long opinions, concurring in part and dissenting in
part. Justice Blackmun joined Justice Black's opinion. Chief Justice Burger joined
Justice White's and most of Justice Black's opinion, and also filed his own brief
opinion. Justice Harlan's concurrence in the judgment did not encompass the section
of the plurality opinion in which Justice Stewart delineated his understanding of the
plain view exception. However, Justice Harlan did not expressly disavow that part of
the opinion, and he did concur with another section incorporating Justice Stewart's
explication of the exception.
80 403 U.S. at 465.
81 Justice Stewart cited several cases which concerned the plain view exception in
searches incident to arrest. Id. The most direct support for Justice Stewart's dicta
was his own concurring opinion in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 569 (1969),
which the majority had decided on first amendment grounds.
82 403 U.S. at 467-68. Justice Stewart's view is consistent with the approach of the
many lower courts which have disregarded Marron and applied the plain view ex-
ception to searches under a warrant. Even before Coolidge, rather than requiring offi-
cers to obtain a new and separate warrant in order to seize unanticipated items,
lower courts often held that, if a search pursuant to a warrant is limited to the
place specified in the warrant and to areas within the place where the specified arti-
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The plurality opinion did not specifically refer to Marron, even though
the extension of the plain view exception to searches under a warrant
amounted to an abandonment of the approach enunciated in that case.
However, in a dissenting opinion, Justice White, joined by Chief Justice
Burger, indicated that the demise of the Marron principle was drawing
near. The dissenters contended that it was anomalous to permit plain view
seizures in connection with warrantless searches, while forbidding the
warrantless seizure of evidence in plain view by officers executing a
search warrant.8 3 Accordingly, Justices White and Burger expressed ap-
proval of the plurality's cursory statement that the plain view exception
applied to searches under a warrant. 84
The question whether Marron imposes limitations on the scope of the
plain view exception remains to be resolved by the Court. In Coolidge, a
majority of the Court indicated a willingness to abandon Marron, at least
where the seized evidence was in plain view.8 5 Nevertheless, the plurality
statement on this point was only dictum which did not even make specific
reference to the Marron case.
If the plain view exception is not yet established with respect to searches
under a warrant, then section 2517(5) is not sustainable on the ground
that it simply restates the existing law of search and seizure and adapts
it to cases involving electronic surveillance. However, even if the Marron
principle is no longer valid, and if the plain view concept does extend to
searches under a warrant, the constitutionality of section 2517(5) is
not established. Since electronic surveillance differs from conventional
searches and seizures in many respects, it must be determinined whether
cles might be concealed, it is lawful to seize other objects falling within plain view.
See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 293 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Bryant v. United
States, 252 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1958); Sanders v. United States, 238 F.2d 145 (10th
Cir. 1956). Contra, United States v. Harrison, 319 F. Supp. 888 (D.N.J. 1970);
United States v. Coots, 196 F. Supp. 775 (E.D. Tenn. 1961).
Initially, such warrantless seizures were limited to contraband and instrumentali-
ties of crime. After the Supreme Court struck down the "mere evidence" rule in
Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), this became an
untenable limitation. Hayden has often been construed as having made any plain
view evidence seizable incident to a warrant so long as the seized items relate to
the criminal behavior in question, even though they are neither contraband nor in-
strumentalities of crime. See, e.g., United States v. Teller, 412 F.2d 374 (7th Cir.
1969); United States v. Singleton, 361 F. Supp. 346 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Taylor v. Min-
nesota, 342 F. Supp. 911 (D. Minn.), afl'd, 466 F.2d 1119 (8th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 956 (1973). The Second Circuit, recognizing Hayden's po-
tential for diluting the particularity requirement of the fourth amendment, has sought
to limit Hayden to searches incident to an arrest, holding that Marron is controlling
where officers executing a warrant seize "mere evidence" not described in the war-
rant. United States v. Dzialak, 441 F.2d 212 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 883
(1971); United States v. LaVallee, 391 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1968). This is ultimately
an unpersuasive analysis, however, since Hayden's rationale for rejecting the "mere
evidence" rule left that rule without viability even in the search warrant context.
83 403 U.S. at 514-15. See LaFave, supra note 65, at 276. But cf. Schwartz, supra
note 1, at 465-66.
84 403 U.S. at 515.
85 See note 79 supra.
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the controlling fourth amendment principles permit the extension of the
plain view doctrine to searches conducted by electronic surveillance.
B. Plain View and Electronic Surveillance
1. Judicial Control-In articulating the rationale of the plain view ex-
ception, the plurality in Coolidge recognized that the use of the term
"plain view" as a legal concept must be distinguished from its use as a
term of description.8 6 Evidence seized by police officers will almost al-
ways be in plain view at the moment of seizure, even where the search
is illegal. However, the plain view exception may be invoked only to justify
the warrantless seizure of evidence where the officer has prior authoriza-
tion for the intrusion which leads to his plain view discovery. 87 Since a
lawful prior intrusion is a condition precedent to a valid plain view seizure,
the Court in Coolidge found the plain view exception to be consistent
with the warrant requirement's objective of eliminating any search or
seizure not justified by a careful prior determination of necessity.88 In
the Court's view, plain view alone is never a sufficient justification for
the seizure of evidence. 89 Because of this limitation, the Court found the
exception to be compatible with the fourth amendment principle of judicial
control over searches by law enforcement officers.
It is doubtful whether section 2517(5) can be constitutionally sustained
in terms of the plain view exception as it was enunciated in Coolidge.
By allowing the disclosure and use of communications concerning crimes
not specified in a Title III surveillance order, the section extends the plain
view concept to the electronic surveillance context without also carrying
over an indispensable limitation on the exception. Section 2517(5), in
effect, applies the plain view exception in circumstances where the in-
tercepting officer often will have no prior justification for the intrusion.
This becomes evident when it is noted that Title III permits, and even
anticipates, the seizure of conversations of persons not specified in the
court order.90 There is no specific judicial authorization with respect to
86 403 U.S. at 465.
87 Id. at 466.
88 Id. at 467.
89 Id. at 468.
90 A principal justification advanced by advocates of electronic surveillance is
that it provides law enforcement agencies with a uniquely valuable method for
obtaining "strategic intelligence" about the activities of organized crime. In the
words of the leading draftsman of Title III:
It is necessary to subject the known criminals to surveillance, that is,
to monitor their activities. It is necessary to identify their criminal and
noncriminal associates; it is necessary to identify their areas of opera-
tion, both legal and illegal. Strategic intelligence attempts to paint
this broad overall picture of the criminal's activities in order that an
investigator can ultimately move in with a specific criminal investiga-
tion and prosecution.
Hearings on Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement Before
the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 957-58 (1967) (testimony of Prof. G. Robert Blakey).
It has often been argued that such strategic surveillance is incompatible with the
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the surveillance of unspecified persons, although the seizure of their con-
versations is subject to fourth amendment standards, including the principle
of judicial control which Katz articulated. However, unspecified parties
do not receive the protection of a prior judicial authorization, as their
conversations are seized in the absence of a prior justification for the
official intrusion upon their reasonable expectation of privacy. 91 Accord-
ingly, even if it is conceded that the plain view seizure of a designated
person's conversation concerning other crimes is consistent with the lim-
itations set forth in Coolidge, such an argument cannot justify the plain
view seizure of incriminating conversations of persons who are not named
in the court order.
The difficulty with applying the plain view doctrine to electronic
searches goes beyond the fact that Title III does not incorporate a crucial
aspect of the Coolidge rationale. There are important differences between
electronic surveillance and conventional searches which suggest that differ-
ent limitations are required if electronic surveillance is to comport with
the principle of judicial control of law enforcement searches. Because it
is inherently uncontrollable, electronic surveillance is more likely than a
conventional search to lead to seizures from parties not specified in the
court authorization. 92 This danger is exacerbated by the fact that often
the very purpose of the monitoring is to gather evidence against many
individuals, including undesignated parties. 93 Electronic surveillance is
further distinguishable from a conventional search in terms of its temporal
duration. A conventional search under a warrant is a single intrusion,
narrowly limited in time, thereby minimizing the danger of discovering
evidence which the warrant does not specify. However, an electronic
surveillance order under Title III permits a continuous series of intrusions
over a period of weeks, or even months, pursuant to a single showing of
probable cause. 94 In such circumstances, incriminating conversations which
restrictions imposed by Berger and Katz. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 1, at 468-72.
See also text accompanying notes 60-63 supra.
91 The facts of Cox v. United States, 449 F.2d 679 (10th Cir. 1971), illustrate
this point. In that case there was prior judicial authorization with respect to the
interception of Richardson's conversations concerning violations of narcotics laws.
However, in the course of the surveillance, the police intercepted conversations
between Richardson and Cox which implicated the former in a bank robbery. The
surveillance of Cox involved an intrusion upon his reasonable expectation of privacy
without a prior judicial determination of probable cause and in the absence of an
exception to the warrant requirement. Consequently, the plain view concept could
not justify the seizure of Cox's conversations without disregarding a key limiting
requirement set forth in Coolidge v. New Hampshire. See notes 108-21 and ac-
companying text infra.
92 See notes 60-61 and accompanying text supra.
93 See note 90 and accompanying text supra. See also note 62 supra.
94 In the words of one commentator:
[The effectiveness of electronic surveillance] normally depends upon a
protracted period of lying-in-wait. For however long that may be,
the lives and thoughts of many people-not merely the immediate
target but all who chance to wander into the web-are exposed to an
unknown and undiscriminating intruder.
Spritzer, supra note 15, at 189.
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the officers are not specifically authorized to seize are almost certain to
fall within plain view. When the monitoring officers overhear conversations
relating to an offense outside the scope of the judicial order, the seizure
of the conversation may be made solely on the basis of their discretionary
determination that it is incriminating. Since they search for an extended
period of time, the plain view concept enhances the latitude of the police
in determining which conversations are subject to seizure.9 5 Although
the dissemination of this information among law enforcement agencies is
not subject to judicial scrutiny, section 2517(5) provides that subsequent
judicial authorization or approval is required in order for conversations
about other crimes to be admitted into testimony in a criminal proceed-
ing.9 6 The statute also states that upon subsequent application the judge
must find that the contents were intercepted in accordance with all other
provisions of the act.9 7 Congress intended that subsequent judicial authori-
zation would rest upon a showing that the original surveillance order was
lawfully obtained and that it was sought in good faith and not as a subter-
fuge for an illegal search. 98 Moreover, Congress envisioned that in most
cases the evidence of other crimes would be intercepted incidentally in the
course of a lawfully executed order.99
Despite the provision of such subsequent judicial oversight, it is ques-
tionable whether section 2517(5) satisfies the principle of judicial control
articulated in Katz.100 This section permits the use of incriminating evi-
dence, notwithstanding the absence of a prior judicial determination that it
should be seized, whereas Katz held that there must be a judicial pre-
determination of the scope of the search, and that law enforcement of-
ficers conducting electronic surveillance must observe precise limits
established in advance by a specific court order. 10' Moreover, the Katz
Court explicitly rejected the claim that subsequent judicial approval of an
interception is a safeguard equivalent to a procedure of antecedent justi-
fication, since after the seizure there is great pressure on the magistrate
to ratify a successful surveillance in order to permit the use of the evi-
dence. 02
Subsequent judicial inquiry probably cannot effectively determine
whether an interception is the product of a subterfuge surveillance. Even
proponents of the plain view exception concede that electronic surveillance
involves a serious danger that police will engage in fishing expeditions
for unknown criminal activity while ostensibly searching for the conversa-
95 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1970) only requires that officers "minimize the intercep-
tion of communications not otherwise subject to interception" and thus is not a
limitation on the discretion of officers in intercepting evidence of other crimes.
96 18 U.S.C. §§ 2517(l)-(3) (1970). See note 10 supra.
97 18 U.S.C. §§ 2517(1)-(3) (1970).
98 S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 100 (1968).
99 Id.
100 See part I supra.
101 389 U.S. at 356-59. See notes 31-40 and accompanying text supra.
102 389 U.S. at 358. See note 36 supra. See also Schwartz, supra note 1, at 487.
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tions which are specified in the court order. 0 3 An obvious answer to this
concern is that there is a parallel risk that conventional search warrants
will be misused. However, this argument overlooks the fact that electronic
surveillance is necessarily a secret search, whereas a physical search usu-
ally provides notice in itself to the subject of the search. 10 4 Accordingly,
subterfuge in the electronic search context is more likely to escape de-
tection 1 05
Those who contend that the plain view doctrine justifies the use of in-
criminating conversations which are not designated in the order have
frequently claimed that the privacy of the individual has already been
invaded by the original search during the course of an investigation for a
designated offense.' 0 6 Proponents of this point of view argue that, since
the intrusion has already occurred, no items seized should be excluded.
The exclusion of such evidence would simply transform the right to privacy
into the right not to be convicted of a crime. This rationale for sustaining
the plain view doctrine in the electronic surveillance context rests on the
questionable assumption that the dissemination and use of intercepted
communications does not involve a continuing intrusion against the de-
fendant's interest in privacy. Furthermore, this line of analysis suggests
that even though law enforcement officers have violated the defendant's
fourth amendment right to be secure from an unreasonable search, as
defined by Katz,10 7 the defendant is not protected from prosecution on the
basis of the unlawfully obtained evidence. To justify the use of the evidence
by arguing that the defendant's privacy has already been violated is to
beg the question whether the defendant has been subjected to an un-
reasonable search.
The constitutional implications of the tension between the plain view
exception and judicial control of electronic surveillance became evident
in Cox v. United States.10 8 Cox stemmed from a federal court order
103 See, e.g., Biddle, Court-Supervised Electronic Searches: A Proposed Statute
for California, 1 PACIFIC L.J. 97 (1970).
104 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355 n.16 (1970).
105 Under Title I1 the subject of an electronic surveillance order has an absolute
right to postsearch notice. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1970). However, persons not
named in the order, even though they may be the actual subjects of subterfuge sur-
veillance have no right to be notified of the interception of their conversations unless
the contents are to be disclosed at a judicial proceeding. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(9) (1970).
Even if communications are disseminated among law enforcement agencies, no
notice is required, unless the communications are 'introduced at a judicial pro-
ceeding. Id.
106 The commentary to the ABA Standards asserts:
[T]he privacy of the individual has already been invaded lawfully by
the original search during the course of an investigation for a designated
offense. Formulating a rule which would prevent the use of such evi-
dence would not change police conduct in the future or protect as
such citizen privacy.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: STANDARDS RELATING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 145 (1968). See also
Biddle, supra note 103, at 116.
107 See note 34 supra.
108 449 F.2d 679 (10th Cir. 1971).
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authorizing agents of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to
intercept wire communications to and from the telephone of Richardson.
The authorization had been granted on the basis of an affidavit establish-
ing probable cause with respect to the violation of federal narcotics laws.
However, while monitoring conversations over the tapped phone, the
federal agents overheard and recorded conversations relating to a bank
robbery. Among the parties to the incriminating conversations were
several persons not specified in the wiretap order, including the petitioner
Cox. Pursuant to section 2517(5), a federal district court authorized the use
and disclosure of these conversations at Cox's trial for bank robbery. 10 9
In appealing his conviction, Cox contended that section 2517(5) is un-
constitutional on its face in that it contravenes the fourth amendment. 110
Cox's objection was that section 2517(5) allows the use of intercepted
telephone communications where the particular interception has not been
previously authorized by a judge. He further maintained that the sub-
sequent authorization procedure required under section 2517(5) did not
satisfy the fourth amendment requirement of judicial control by means
of specific prior authorization. Although the Tenth Circuit conceded that
specific prior authorization is prescribed by Berger, Katz, and Osborn,
it noted that the Supreme Court had not directly passed on the question
of subsequent judicial approval of unanticipated incriminating material
obtained incident to a warrant describing other subject matter."' The
court was not persuaded by Cox's challenge to section 2517(5), although
it did not base its decision on the plain view doctrine, which the govern-
ment had advanced in support of the provision's constitutionality." 2 Con-
tending that the general principles controlling electronic surveillance orders
were similar to those governing search warrants for the seizure of tangible
evidence, the government analogized the seizure of unanticipated con-
versations to the seizure of unanticipated physical evidence. The court
did not find the comparison persuasive, concluding that the quest for pri-
vate communications is a different and more traumatic intrusion than is
the search for physical objects. 113 While the court did not elaborate this
point, it was simply restating a basic premise of the Berger and Katz de-
cisions.1 14
Underlying the Supreme Court's view of fourth amendment standards
is the belief that electronic surveillance is inherently unmanageable.' 1 5
Viewing electronic searches as involving a grave threat to individual se-
curity from unreasonable searches and seizures, the Court has emphasized
that a specific prior authorization is an indispensable precondition of law-
109 Id. at 679-82.
110 Id. at 682.
111 Id. at 685.
112 Id. at 686.
113 Id. See notes 60-63 and accompanying text supra. See also notes 92-95 and
accompanying text supra.
114 See part I A supra.
115 See notes 61-62 supra.
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ful surveillance.' 16 The Cox court shared this awareness of the unman-
ageability of electronic surveillance, noting that once the listening com-
mences it becomes infeasible to turn it off when an unauthorized conver-
sation is overheard. 117 However, the court concluded that it would be un-
reasonable to draw distinctions between that information which is speci-
fically authorized and that which is unanticipated and which is seized in
the course of an authorized search, 118 rather than finding that this unman-
ageability led to violations of Cox's fourth amendment right to be free
from an unauthorized search and seizure. 119
The Cox court upheld the use of the intercepted statements on the
ground that the search was reasonable, thus departing from the mode
of fourth amendment analysis which the Supreme Court relied upon in
Katz. Katz emphasized that a seizure could not be deemed reasonable
merely because the officers had engaged in a restrained and limited sur-
veillance. 20 Prior judicial authorization was held to be a sine qua non of a
reasonable search and seizure, unless an exception to the warrant re-
quirement was applicable. Any other search is per se unreasonable and
in violation of the fourth amendment. 12 1 While the Cox court conceded
that the search had not received prior judicial authorization, the court,
in sustaining a conviction based on the seizure of Cox's words, was re-
luctant to base its decision on any exception to the warrant requirement.
However, in rejecting the Katz approach, the Tenth Circuit advanced no
alternative framework for principled analysis of the fourth amendment.
Concluding that the intrusion was reasonable and that section 2517(5)
is constitutional, the court, in effect, nullified the warrant requirement
of the fourth amendment as applied to the defendant Cox.
2. Particularity-In articulating the circumstances under which the
plain view exception will permit departure from the warrant requirement,
the Supreme Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire12 2 held that a lawful
plain view seizure requires that the evidence be inadvertently discovered,
and that its incriminating character be immediately apparent to the officers
who make the seizure. This restriction renders the exception consistent
with the particularity requirement of the fourth amendment by preventing
the police from transforming an initially limited search into a general ex-
ploratory search. 12
3
This limitation on the plain view exception cannot be meaningfully in-
116 See part I B supra.
117 449 F.2d at 686-87.
118 Id.
119 This was the conclusion which Justice Douglas drew from the Tenth Circuit's
discussion in Cox. Cox v. United States, 406 U.S. 934 (1972), denying cert. to 449
F.2d 679 (10th Cir. 1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
120 See notes 35-36 and accompanying text supra.
121 See notes 33-35 and accompanying text supra.
122403 U.S. 443 (1971).
123 403 U.S. at 469-70. For an extensive discussion concerning the approach of
lower courts to this limitation, see Note, supra note 65. See also notes 73-87 and
accompanying text supra.
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corporated into the electronic search context. The key factor which
distinguishes electronic surveillance from conventional searches is the
unmanageability of the former. 124 Because of this difference the extension
of the plain view exception to the electronic search context raises serious
questions with respect to the particularity requirement of the fourth
amendment. Whereas a conventional search warrant can designate unique
objects to be found in the place which is to be searched, the specification
of the item to be seized is unusually speculative and imprecise when the
object is a future conversation.125 Accordingly, officers conducting elec-
tronic surveillance are likely to have a less clear idea of the object of their
search than officers executing a conventional warrant. They may also
have greater difficulty in determining whether they have realized the
object of the search. 1 26 Since the effective implementation of the partic-
ularity standard requires that the executing officers know what they are
looking for and when they should search no further, electronic surveil-
lance involves an especially serious danger that even officers with lawful
intentions will exceed the scope of the court order. 2 7
Particularity is especially difficult to achieve in the conduct of electronic
surveillance for another reason. In a conventional search, the officer must
engage in some overt act in order to seize an object. He must determine
whether the object to be seized is specified in the warrant or whether it is
seizable under the plain view exception because of its immediately ap-
parent incriminating character. However, in the conduct of electronic
surveillance, not only is it inevitable that there are many seizures which
are unrelated to the offense for which the order is issued, but the seizure
of a conversation often occurs before its character has been determined
124 See notes 60-61 and accompanying text supra.
125 In the words of one court:
[I]t is much easier to describe with particularity in a warrant the nature
and contents of a physical object than a conversation which has not yet
been heard.
United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1047 (D. Md.), a/I'd sub non. United
States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 416 U.S. 505 (1974). See
also Spritzer, supra note 15, at 189.
126 See note 128 inIra.
12T In comparing electronic surveillance and conventional searches, Professor
Spritzer noted:
[T]here are limitations in the nature and practice of the conventional
search that cannot be incorporated in the electronic search. It is un-
doubtedly true that if the police are engaged in a visual search for a
designated object, they are very likely to see numerous other tangible
items in their quest for the specified one. However, it is by no means in-
evitable that they will see or examine every possession of the resident.
The officer engaged in the traditional search announces his identity
and provides notice of the extent of his authority. The homeowner or
office tenant may be able to satisfy the warrant by voluntarily pro-
ducing or promptly revealing the item in question. In other situations,
the character of the described item will itself impose limitations.
[Electronic surveillance] has no channel and is certain to be far
more pervasive and intrusive than a properly conducted search for a
specific, tangible object at a defined location.
Spritzer, supra note 15, at 188-89.
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to be incriminating. 128 Whereas the particularity requirement in the setting
of a conventional search is likely to limit the seizure to items specified
in the warrant, electronic surveillance involves the seizure of many items
prior to a determination of whether they are within the scope of either the
warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement. Therefore, since even
the most carefully conducted electronic search resembles a dragnet pro-
cedure which is likely to produce a vast evidentiary windfall, the plain
view doctrine constitutes a much broader exception with respect to elec-
tronic searches than with respect to conventional searches.
It may be argued that since the seizure of many conversations not
specified in the court order is inevitable, this factor actually cuts in favor
of section 2517(5)'s extension of the plain view exception. This argu-
ment rests on the tacit assumption that the extension of the plain view
concept to electronic surveillance does not affect the officers' conduct in
executing a surveillance order. 129 However, some commentators have
noted that section 2517(5) provides a disincentive for officers to limit
the scope of their search, thus undermining the particularity requirement. 130
The exclusion of evidence obtained from conversations outside the scope
of the court order, it is argued, would provide some limitations on the
scope of surveillance by reducing the incentive of officers to exceed the
scope of the surveillance order.131
The particularity standard underlying section 2517(5) does not fully
comport with the strict standard mandated by Berger v. New York, 132
where the Court's premise was that the need for particularity is especially
great in searches conducted by electronic surveillance. Berger struck down
a procedure which gave the executing officer a "roving commission" to
seize any conversations, regardless of their nexus with the purpose of the
search. 133 By permitting executing officers to seize any incriminating con-
versations outside the scope of the initial authorization, the plain view
128 In the words of one court:
[In a conventional search] the law enforcement officer can by sight
and touch generally determine before he takes the item into his
custody whether it is something which he is authorized to seize by the
warrant while in the [case of electronic surveillance] he can generally
determine with exactness whether the conversation is authorized to be
seized by the warrant only when he has already taken it into his
custody by having heard it in its entirety.
United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1047 (D. Md.), af/'d sub noin. United
States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), afl'd, 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
129 See note 106 supra.
130 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 1, at 465-66. Since section 2517 permits the
use of unspecified conversations seized in the course of electronic surveillance, it is
arguable that investigating officers are encouraged to engage in a general, explora-
tory surveillance on the basis of the initial court authorization. This argument is
especially persuasive when one recalls that electronic surveillance is most valuable
for gathering strategic intelligence about criminal activities. See note 90 and ac-
companying text supra.
131 Schwartz, supra note 1, at 463-64.
132 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
133 ld. at 59.
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exception effectively converts every court order for surveillance into a
"roving commission," similar to those which Berger prohibited." 4
Despite the disparity between Berger and Title III, the courts which
have considered the question have upheld section 2517(5), rejecting
constitutional challenges directed at its compliance with the particularity
requirement of the fourth amendment. 13 5 For example, in United States v.
Escandar,136 where the defendants unsuccessfully claimed that section
2517(5) was unconstitutional on its face as allowing an indiscriminate
and overbroad search, the court observed that the section permits the
seizure and use of conversations concerning other crimes only on the
condition that the original warrant was valid and that efforts had been
made to minimize interceptions of innocent conversations. The controlling
principle, in the court's view, was that if the original court order is valid
and its execution has been lawfully conducted, seizure of unrelated in-
criminating evidence is permissible. 137 The Escandar decision uncritically
extends the plain view exception from the conventional search context
to cases involving electronic surveillance. The logic underlying this ex-
tension is straightforward. Since electronic surveillance is within the
scope of the fourth amendment, it is controlled by the recognized excep-
tions to the warrant requirement. 1 38 This approach, however, does not
rest upon any perceptible analytical justification for the analogy drawn
between physical and electronic searches insofar as the plain view doctrine
is concerned, and it conflicts with the recognition in Berger that the un-
usually intrusive nature of electronic surveillance requires an especially
strict application of the particularity standard in order to prevent the ex-
ecuting officer from engaging in a general exploratory search. 139 The plain
view doctrine may satisfy constitutional standards for physical searches
pursuant to a warrant, since such searches are inherently limited in scope
by the nature of the object being sought. However, in the less manageable
context of the electronic search, the plain view exception involves a greater
risk to the particularity requirement, which the courts upholding section
2517(5) have failed to consider carefully.
134 Id. at 57.
135See, e.g., United States v. Tortorello, 342 F. Supp. 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), afl'd,
480 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973); United States v. Sklaroff,
323 F. Supp. 296 (S.D. Fla. 1971); United States v. Escandar, 319 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.
Fla. 1970); cf. United States v. Denisio, 360 F. Supp. 715 (D. Md. 1973).
136319 F. Supp. 295 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
17 Id. at 301.
138 In United States v. Sklaroff, 323 F. Supp. 296 (S.D. Fla. 1971), the same
court again considered whether section 2517(5) measures up to the particularity
standard of the fourth amendment. Again the court saw no merit in the petitioners'
contention that in not excluding intercepted conversations about a crime not spe-
cified in the order, the provision lacked particularity. Since it was "settled law" that
unspecified items might be seized if discovered in the course of a lawful search
under a warrant, "[b]y analogy, the same rule should apply to conversations, which
are seizures under the Katz case." Id. at 307.
139 See part I supra.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The seizure and use of conversations concerning crimes which are not
designated in a Title III court order cannot be constitutionally justified
as simply the extension of a clearly delineated exception to the warrant
requirement of the fourth amendment. First, it remains to be resolved
whether the plain view concept applies to searches under a warrant. The
subsequent use provision of Title III is in direct conflict with Marron, and
if the Supreme Court upholds the principle that an officer executing a
warrant may not seize items not designated therein, then section 2517(5)
is clearly unconstitutional. However, even if the plain view doctrine is
eventually sustained with respect to searches pursuant to a warrant, the
limitations on the doctrine do not permit its extension to cases involving
electronic surveillance. Because of important differences between con-
ventional searches and electronic surveillance, such as the inherent un-
mangeability and intrusiveness of the latter, the extension of the plain
view exception to electronic surveillance would undermine the constitu-
tional requirements of judicial control and particularity.
Section 2517(5) can be justified in terms of the plain view exception
only if a prior justification for the intrusion is not deemed an essential
precondition, and only if the exception is held to apply even where the
incriminating character of the item seized is not readily apparent. The
existing parameters of the plain view exception, as articulated in Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, do not give the exception such a broad scope.
If the plain view exception does not sustain section 2517(5), then that
provision can only be upheld through an approach similar to that adopted
by the court in Cox v. United States. Rejecting the plain view analogy, the
Cox court arrived at a determination of the reasonableness of a search
without reference to the warrant requirement or any specifically
established exception. To resolve the constitutionality of section 2517(5)
in this manner requires a dramatic and unwarranted departure from the
existing framework of fourth amendment doctrine. Therefore, principled
analysis should lead courts to conclude that section 2517(5) is un-
constitutional.
-Raymond R. Kepner
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